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1 Introduction 
 
In 1987, Taiwan’s martial law, imposed in 1948, was lifted. Reality had 
caught up with the Kuomintang (KMT) government, and claims to 
mainland China were dropped in 1991. The government’s focus turned to 
Taiwan as a country in its own right. Taiwan found itself in the 
predicament of, on the one hand, being an internationally acknowledged 
economic powerhouse, recognised as a developed country, while on the 
other hand denied the status of an independent country by the 
international community. This to appease the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) who maintains its claim on Taiwan, considering it a renegade 
province. This background frames my research. As politicians claimed the 
stage in the dispute between Taiwan and the PRC, the population of 
Taiwan was subjected to dramatic changes in position taken over time. 
How did they cope? For answers I will focus on the period, 2004 – 2013, 
the period I lived and worked in Taiwan, experiencing change first-hand. I 
approach the subject from the perspective of critical heritage studies, 
looking for answers in history and cultural heritage.  
Two interrelated issues dominate Taiwan’s politics, and with this 
Taiwan’s society. Externally this is the standoff between Taiwan and the 
PRC, internally it is the sharp divide within Taiwan’s society on many 
issues, explicit in the rivalry between the two main political parties, the 
KMT and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). At the heart of these 
issues lies defining the Taiwanese identity. The PRC’s claim is based on 
Taiwan’s Chineseness, on Taiwan being an integrated part of China’s 
history and culture. Internally the KMT and DPP carry the discussion on 
Chineseness or Taiwaneseness through to the extent that the public 
debate is immersed in the issue of identity.  
With this dispute on Chineseness or Taiwaneseness as object, and 
critical heritage studies as approach, I will research the effects of the 
absence of a nation-building tradition based on Taiwan as a country, set 
off against the strong nation-building history of China. This positions a 
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strongly promoted Chinese identity against a repressed Taiwanese 
identity. I will look for answers as to what constitutes Taiwan’s history and 
where to look for heritage and culture relevant to Taiwan’s identity. I will 
question whether history and cultural heritage is the right approach to 
determine sameness or otherness.  
  
Relevance 
Regarding the PRC’s claim for unification: the KMT is averse to 
controversy and is on a course towards reconciliation, but with an unclear 
endgame. The DPP on the other hand, in power from 2000 – 2008 and 
again in 2016, opts for continued factual independence while shying away 
from claiming sovereignty altogether. In 2016, Taiwan’s identity was the 
ticket on which the DPP won the presidential elections. This reconfirms 
that Taiwan’s identity will remain a dominant issue.  
The standoff between the PRC and Taiwan is not an isolated dispute. 
Tensions in East Asia are mounting with conflicting territorial claims 
affecting most countries bordering on the South China Sea, and Japan on 
the East China Sea. Taiwan’s geographical location in the centre of this 
area adds a new dimension to the Taiwan – PRC relationship. Will the PRC 
go down the road of confrontation and physically domination or will they, 
building on their new economic clout, go down the contemporary route of 
neo-imperialism, where decisive influence is the goal? These are 
questions very much in play in the situation between Taiwan - PRC, 
meriting renewed international attention for Taiwan.   
 
Source material 
The thesis topic is content rich. My main approach is through critical 
analysis of Taiwan’s history and heritage discourse. Background readings 
include the Qing dynasty colonisation (1683 – 1895), Japanese 
colonisation (1895 – 1945), China’s Nationalist government (1927 – 
1948) and the martial law period (1948 – 1987). I do not enter into 
discussions on individual historical topics but focus on the heritage 
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derived from these periods that have become part of Taiwan’s identity. 
This is complimented by interviews and with my personal experiences 
when living and working in Taiwan. I have visited most of the sites 
mentioned in this thesis, historical or other, including the Southern Branch 
of the National Palace Museum and twelve potential world heritage sites 
selected by Taiwan’s Counsel for Cultural affairs, discussed in more depth.  
 
Thesis outline 
The thesis is built up in three distinct sections. The first section provides 
context, historical and political background, and recent events that have 
had an impact on Taiwan’s society immediately before and during the 
period under review. This section starts with chapter 2, which is a 
theoretical study on history, nation building and national history serving 
as a basis for the following chapters. Chapter 3 focusses on Taiwan’s 
earlier history as part of the Qing Empire, the main historical basis of 
China’s claim to Taiwan. Chapter 4 describes the situation of two Chinas, 
the China of the PRC and the China by proxy of the KMT, the controversy 
that lies at the heart of Taiwan’s situation today. In chapter 5, I discuss 
Taiwan’s democratisation process, which ignited an ambition for 
independence. As mentioned, Taiwan is internally heavily divided, of 
which the KMT and DPP rivalry is symptomatic. In chapters 6 and 7, I 
examine their respective characters and which Taiwan they represent. 
Chapters 8 describes events that had an impact on Taiwan’s society 
directly before 2004-2013, the period under review. 
The second section, is about Taiwan’s identity. Chapter 9 describes 
events, incidents and developments in the period 2004-2013 that 
provided collective experiences. Chapter 10, consolidates the historical 
periods, events and incidents mentioned in section 1, and captures 
memories of these. Chapters 11 and 12 deal with institutionalises forms 
of memory creation and conservation. I examine the politics of museums 
and analyse the selection of potential World Heritage sites by the Taiwan 
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government. In chapter 13, I turn to alternative sources for symbols and 
expression of identity. 
The third and final section, chapter 14, serves as a mirror for the 
results of my study. It is a compilation of three interviews with foreign 
representatives, de-facto ambassadors, active in Taiwan in the period 
2004-2013, sharing their knowledge and insight of Taiwan gained and 
used in their professional capacity.   
 
Section 1 
 
2 History and nation-building 
 
As far as the PRC is concerned, there is no dispute on nationhood 
between the PRC and Taiwan. The 1992 ‘One China two interpretations’ is 
as far as an acceptable statement on the subject goes. China’s borders 
are not up for debate. The question is confined to who represents China, 
including Taiwan. Reality is however that Taiwan functions as a nation, 
demonstrating that nationhood does not require sovereignty (Duara 2009, 
28). There are more such nations. Examples are Abkhazia’s and South 
Ossetia’s breakaway from Georgia and Transnistria’s secession from 
Moldavia. What is exceptional in Taiwan’s case is the political isolation of 
the island on the one hand and its strong economic status on the other. 
Taiwan matters. The isolation, with which the people of Taiwan are 
confronted on a daily basis, has become formative for Taiwan’s national 
identity. So, contradictory, the PRC politics of isolation strengthens 
Taiwan’s nationhood. Where nations within nation states are weakened 
over time by assimilation, isolation by the contesting nation state has the 
reverse effect (Harrison 2008, 128).  
Nation states are a relatively new phenomenon; they are products 
of modernity. As dynastic realms, based on divine authority and mutual 
alliances, waned, the nation as an entity emerged. The 19th century saw a 
world system of nations develop. Spurred by the industrial revolution, a 
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sense of regional competition took hold. With this, wealth, geography and 
population became powerful competitive assets. The Qing dynasty was a 
victim of these changes. Encroachment by nations threatening de facto 
colonisation and internal challenges to authority and the resulting chaos, 
brought the dynasty down. Geographically, the Qing empire also fell apart 
in the process. Taiwan was ceded to Japan as spoils of war in 1895, Tibet 
and Outer Mongolia brook away at the time of fall of the empire in 1911 
and disputed border areas with surrounding countries were resigned to. 
The Republic of China’s (ROC), and later the PRC’s, claim to be the 
successor of the Qing dynasty justifies today’s territorial claims. Taiwan 
was ceded to China in 1945 after World War II, Tibet was annexed in 
1950, and tension over disputed border areas have not fully receded. In 
view of the sensitivities surrounding the geographical integrity of China, 
the exclusion of Taiwan after the civil war in 1949 is an affront.    
History is the safest and most secure route to success, and on both 
sides of the Taiwan strait different versions of recent history emerged. 
Events do not unfold into a narrative. Quite the opposite. Narratives select 
events. Narratives are made by an authority who has the prerogative of 
interpretation and of determining significance, morality and message 
(White 1990, 19). In a nation state, the state claims this authority. 
Depending on the state form, the state can either impose authority or 
influence the narrative. The education system is a powerful influencing 
tool. Museums too are institutes through which a chosen history is told. 
Repression and influencing of alternative means of conveying history, 
such as art, music, film and social media compliments acceptance of the 
chosen history (Anderson 2006, 163-164). Changing the historical 
narrative is apparent in Taiwan and is both a source and a result of 
external and internal tension. History is fluid and therefore holds no 
authority for the future. Here heritage comes into the equation. As Harvey 
puts it, heritage is the history of the present (2008, 23). So it is the 
chosen heritage, reflecting a chosen future that lies at the core of the 
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Taiwan – China stand-off. History, heritage and agents of change are 
discussed in the following chapters.  
 
3 Taiwan enters history 
 
Nations claims are not benign. They lay claim on territories through 
essentialist criteria. Sun Yat Sen described the Han nation as the perfect 
nation combining, in his view, all criteria: race, language, custom, religion 
and livelihood (Duara 1995, 32). A view he altered when he set his 
ambitions for republican China higher to include other Qing dynasty 
territory. The enlarged territory came with changed criteria, providing 
space for multi-ethnicity within the nation state. Shared history and 
culture became the new criteria.  
The Qing empire had little nationalistic traits. The dynasty centred 
around the Manchu court. Retaining the power of the court took 
precedence over geographical and social considerations. Economical 
relevance and strategic importance trumped defence of land for the sake 
of land. Borderlands were peripheral areas with little military and 
administrative resources allotted. This was also true for Taiwan. The 
colonisation of Taiwan by the Qing in 1683 was a by-product of the Qing 
campaign against the Ming loyalist forces. Opponents saw no value in the 
‘ball of mud’. It was barbarian country and would only be a drain on the 
empire’s resources. Arguments on Taiwan’s strategic importance 
eventually swayed the emperor towards colonizing the island (Teng). This 
sense of being in the periphery and isolated is a common thread in 
Taiwan’s identity, continued through the Japanese colonial period till 
today, with the active international isolation of Taiwan by the PRC (Duara 
2003, Teng 2004). 
With the transformation of China into a nation state, cumulating 
into the fall of the Qing in 1911 and the start of the Republican period, a 
national history, focussed on China as a country and on the integrity of its 
borders, became important. As Tibet and Outer Mongolia broke away, an 
ethnic Han-centric historical narrative arose. Soon, inspired by the May 
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Fourth Movement, a reaction by intellectuals on, in their view, unfair 
treatment of China at the 1919 Versailles conference settling state affairs 
after the ending of the first World War, a dominant Chinese culture 
replaced Han ethnicity as motivation for territorial claims. As a result of 
this change of historical narrative, these claims now included borderlands 
(Duara 2003, 191). An effect of Chinese nationalism is that there is a 
stronger sense of injury inflicted to sovereignty by the Taiwan situation 
today than there was at the time Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1985. 
 
4 Two Chinas? 
 
When the KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1949 and continued the ROC, 
Taiwan was used as a blank sheet on which China by proxy was projected. 
China’s administrative institutions, culture and history were imposed on a 
population with only memories of the Japanese colonial period. This was 
aided by the approximately two million influx of mainland Chinese in the 
period 1945 -1949, on an original population of five million at that time, 
representing a dramatic change of demography (Reynaud 2003, 19). 
Tensions between the population groups erupted in 1947 when an 
incident, now known as the February 28 (2/28) incident, led to the killing 
of a bystander. The following days the Taiwanese turned on Mainland 
Chinese migrants. The KMT lost control. A week after the start of the 
violence, a large detachment of KMT troops arrived on the island and 
immediately started randomly massacring the population (Lin 2007, 8-9, 
Berry 2008: 228-229). The incident was buried in history for a long time. 
In 1992, pressured by the DPP, the Taiwan KMT government issued a 
report estimating the casualties of this episode to be between 18,000 to 
28,000 native-born Taiwanese (Lin 2007, 12, Renaud 2002, 48). This 
incident, and repression in the following martial law period, also referred 
to as the period of White Terror with its unspecified number of casualties, 
contributed to an internally-oriented disposition of the population. Martial 
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law was only lifted in 1987, at which time it was the longest period of 
martial law in modern history. 
While the KMT continued the nationalistic version of China on 
Taiwan, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), drastically disposed of many 
Chinese traditions after taking over power. The Marxist, class-based view 
of society identified internal enemies, standing in the way of the socialist 
ideal state. The traditional society was, in the view of the CCP, the conduit 
for the higher classes to collect and maintain wealth at the expense of the 
lower classes. So while in Taiwan Mainland Chinese society was 
superimposed on a population with a considerably different modern 
history, in China the CCP set out to deconstruct the existing social fabric. 
The apex of cultural destruction was the cultural revolution with the call of 
destruction of the ‘four olds’: old customs, habits, culture and thinking. 
These were standing, according to representatives of the CCP, in the way 
of modernity. Chinese cultural heritage, both tangible and intangible, was 
archaic, serving an undesirable social structure. Ancient Chinese 
philosophers were discredited and religions severely repressed or banned. 
Any philosophy or doctrine outside the realm of the CCP was an 
obstruction to the development of the country (Denton 2014, 20, Kuo 
2000, 86).  
So ironically it was the KMT that was the guardian of a common 
Chinese culture, transforming Taiwan into a Chinese heritage protection 
area. This is where Chinese culture, history, religion, language and art 
were conserved. This constructed image was imposed at the expense of 
local culture and history. With Mandarin replacing Japanese as the 
administrative language, the use of local languages such as Hoklo and 
Hakka was, contrary to the Japanese period, suppressed. Japanese 
influence on Taiwanese art was ridiculed, describing Taiwanese artists as 
“worshippers of other’s ancestors” (Kuo 2000, 74) and Shinto temples 
demolished or put to alternative use (ibid, 28). Dealing with the Japanese 
cultural period in general was problematic for the KMT. World War II is 
referred to, in both Taiwan and the PRC, as the second Sino Japanese war 
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and this war was, the KMT claims, won by the KMT at great expense and 
with little help from other parties. Taiwanese however fought in the 
Japanese imperial army. This was completely ignored in the history text 
books used in the martial law period. The war history portrayed as 
national history was that of mainland China and Taiwanese resistance to 
Japanese occupation. Only in the 1990s were the China centred history 
textbooks replaced by a Taiwan centred curriculum approaching Taiwan’s 
history from a successive colonial rule. (Jones 2013, 174-177).  
As the historical narrative changed once again in Taiwan, so too in 
China. In the 1990s we see a rehabilitation of Chinese culture as the CCP 
moved away from the communist, class based, universalism towards 
capitalism, creating an employ for Chinese nationalism and so moving 
towards the KMT’s version of China during the martial law period. Taiwan’s 
movement towards recognizing a multi-cultural society should therefore 
not be disassociated with the political need to be different.    
 
5 Taiwan nationhood 
 
Taiwan does not have a democratic heritage, and yet a home grown 
democracy emerged out of repression. When in 1971 the PRC replaced 
the ROC as representative of China in the United Nations (UN) and with 
the simultaneous expulsion of the ROC from the UN, Taiwan being a 
synonym for China was internationally recognised for the façade it was. 
When the US switched recognition of the government of China from the 
ROC to the PRC in 1979, international isolation was complete.  
Important changes were taking place in Taiwan during this time. 
The island’s economy took off. Taiwan derived a status as one of the Asian 
Tigers, on par with Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore. Also around this 
time, in December 1979, the Kaohsiung incident took place. A 
demonstration by political activists on Human Rights Day, demanding 
democracy, resulted in the arrest of the leading activists. The crackdown 
and harsh treatment of the arrested activists met with condemnation both 
in Taiwan and abroad. Ultimately, the aftermath of the incident led to the 
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KMT’s recognition that justification of Taiwan’s existence as a nation is 
found in a favourable comparison against the PRC. Taiwan’s image must 
become its strength. With economic success, the effects of political 
isolation were alleviated by the fast expanding contacts international 
trade brought, but Taiwan’s repressive politics were hurting its reputation. 
Another consideration was that with the curtailing of recognition by the 
US, the US regulated their relationship with Taiwan by its unilateral 
Taiwan Relations Act (1979), with which the US committed itself to the 
defence of Taiwan (Columbia). For continued domestic support in the US, 
the moral high ground compared to the PRC on issues such as democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law became an important incentive (Copper 
2009, 470).  
Local developments were also moving towards change. A Taiwan 
consciousness was emerging, feeding off ethnic tension between the 
Mainland Chinese, who had arrived with the KMT and, in particular, the 
Taiwanese from Fujian origin, and the largest population group, the Hoklo. 
The KMT started on a process of redefining itself. President Chiang Ching-
kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek, in office from 1978 to 1988, supervised this 
period. Responsible for the harsh actions against the political activists of 
the Kaohsiung incident, he changed course in the early 1980s. He 
prepared the route towards democracy. Opposition parties were allowed 
to form. The political activists of the Kaohsiung incident formed the DPP in 
1986, and became the main opposition party. Martial law was lifted during 
President Chiang Ching-kuo’s term in 1987, entering Taiwan into a new 
phase and earning him the title of Taiwan’s democratiser. He was 
succeeded by President Lee Teng-hui, not a Mainlander but from 
Taiwanese Hakka decent. Lee Teng-hui completed the democratisation 
process. His re-instalment election in 1996 was the first presidential 
election. In 2000, DPP candidate Sen Sui-bian won the presidency, sealing 
Taiwan’s ‘democratic miracle’. This turn of events brought on a volatility to 
Taiwanese politics, setting the stage for the vast changes in the period 
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under review in this thesis (Copper 2009, 470-471, Liu et al. 2005, 105-
106).  
 
6 KMT transformation 
 
Taiwan is heavily divided internally. Handling the Mainland’s claim to the 
island is an overriding cause of contention but by far not the only one. 
Because of demographic differences between the North and the South of 
the island, with the Mainland migrants predominantly settling in the North 
resulting in a mixed population, and the Hoklo population traditionally 
with a large concentration in the South, the North-South division puts 
stress on the cohesion of the country (Hsieh and Niou 1996). As in many 
other countries, a different pace of development between the regions 
brings on accusations of exploitation. Feelings of exclusion due to ethnic 
origins adds to the mix. This social division translates politically into a 
‘pan blue alliance’ of which the KMT is the main representative, and a ‘pan 
green alliance’ led by the DPP. Insight into the KMT – DPP rivalry is 
important for an insight into the debate on Taiwan’s identity.  
A question outsiders remain with when getting to know Taiwan, is 
the source of the vitality of the KMT. Whereas in other countries 
democratisation led to the end or marginalization of autocratic parties in 
power, most notably the democratisation of Eastern Europe, the KMT not 
only survived but remains dominant in Taiwan. The 2/28 incident, 
memory of which was revived by the DPP, and the repression of the 
martial law period, did not lead to taking vengeance on the KMT. As early 
as 1989, only two years after the lifting of the martial law, ‘City of 
Sadness’, a film by Hou Hsiou-hsien was released and shown in Taiwan, 
reviving the memory of that period without noticeable repercussions for 
the KMT (Renaud 2002).  
A number of factors will have had an impact on the KMT’s resilience. 
First, because of the sheer period of forty years of martial law, many had 
little or no memory of life without the KMT. The party’s authoritative rule 
was associated to the larger than life personage of Chiang Kai-shek, 
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deflecting party accountability. Second, next to direct military 
suppression, culture is an indirect means of controlling a colony. The 
imposed Mainland culture, such as mandatory use of Mandarin, assuming 
China’s history as Taiwan’s history and discouraging non-Chinese 
influences in arts, served disciplining purposes. Third, the Mainlanders 
who had arrived in Taiwan in the wake of the civil war and represented 
the new rulers, served as cultural reference. A reflex to colonisation is 
matching the cultural level of the coloniser. This is an act of liberation by 
becoming peer instead of remaining subject which, paradoxically, serves 
the interest of the coloniser, in this case the KMT (Kuo 2000, 60).  
Sinification however was not all about suppression. The Chinese 
nationalists were genuinely convinced that Sinification led to the 
betterment of borderland people (Duara 2003, 193). However, with 
labelling Taiwanese culture inferior to the Chinese, the KMT laid the seed 
for ethnic identification, in particular for the Hoklo majority. This ethnic 
tension later played a role in the continued relevance of the KMT, 
providing the KMT with an powerbase when democracy arrived (Copper 
2009: 466, Hsu 2009, 298). 
To counter pariah state status, KMT leadership realised that it also 
needed to shed its authoritarian character. After the false start with the 
Kaohsiung incident, the democratisation process was set in with little 
violence or social upheaval. Freedom of speech, association, movement 
and political party formation were introduced. The KMT also democratised 
from within. Native Taiwanese entered cadre ranks, reflecting the 
assimilation of population groups that had set in. The KMT no longer was 
solely associated with those arriving from the Mainland. The chosen 
history shifted, evidenced by the new Knowing Taiwan textbooks. National 
history became limited to Taiwanese history only. Taiwan is presented as 
an emerging nation, geographically limited to the main island of Taiwan 
and neighbouring small islands under Taiwan’s administration. An 
immigrant country with an history of successive colonisation. The 
revaluation of the Japanese colonial period was particularly controversial. 
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The image of Japan as arch enemy was exchanged for a more favourable 
image, in line with existing public sentiment. Economic growth, bringing 
the rise of a large middle class and a generally broad wealth distribution, 
the KMT-led democratisation process and the adoption of a Taiwanese 
history resulted in an apologetic disposition towards the KMT at a 
considerable part of the population, going a long way in explaining the 
KMT’s continued powerbase. The KMT had real achievements to claim 
(Bernstein 2008, 926, Corcuff 2005, 138-139).  
 
7 The emergence of the DPP 
 
With the question on the KMT’s vitality, a second question outsiders have 
is why the DPP, founded in 1986 and with its roots in protests against 
infringed liberties, did not emerge as the dominant party when democracy 
arrived in 1987. As already mentioned, the DPP is linked to the Kaohsiung 
incident of 1979. The oppositional Formosan Magazine, established in that 
year, was instrumental to the incident. The human rights protest leading 
up to the incident was organised by this magazine. The severe crackdown 
on KMT opposition following the incident was accompanied by fierce 
accusations by KMT controlled press, linking the protest movement to PRC 
subversion aimed at destabilizing the country. These accusations had its 
effect on the image of the movement (Lin 2007, 5). After the initial 
suppression, the KMT realised that times had changed and started the 
democratisation process. While the Kaohsiung incident certainly was a 
catalyser, the DPP, evolving out of the protest movement, could not claim 
revolutionary victory (Copper 2009, 470-471).  
The DPP emerged as a populist party. Not based on top-down 
realisation of political principles but rather on localism; on bottom-up 
initiated advancement of target constituencies, largely based on ethnic 
group. This ethnic group was the Hoklo majority. Illustrating this is that at 
the 2000 presidential elections, upwards of 95% of the DPP votes came 
from the Hoklo community (Hsu 2009, 305). However, although the Hoklo 
population form about 64% of the population (Central Intelligence 
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Agency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), not all identify themselves with the 
DPP. Assimilation has blurred ethnic lines. The KMT, which had developed 
into a more inclusive party with vastly more governmental experience, 
financial means and with a track record in economic development and 
political reform, managed to appeal to a majority of the population in the 
early years of democracy.  
It is easy to be judgmental of DPP populism, but resorting to 
populism was inevitable. All governmental and political structures had 
been introduced by the KMT and the KMT manned the key positions 
coming out of the martial law era. Disregarding these structures and 
going straight to the base infringes on the KMT’s head start. 
As for China’s claim to Taiwan, the main point of contention 
between the KMT and the DPP is Taiwan’s independence. The DPP has 
expressed independence as ultimate goal, antagonizing the PRC. The 
KMT’s policy is to retain the status quo incorporated in the 1992 
consensus of ‘One China, two interpretations’. A peculiar implication of 
this is that this consensus requires a continued claim by the ROC on all of 
China. The risk involved with the DPP ambition for independence serves 
as deterrent to risk-adverse voters. Intimidation by the PRC drives home 
this risk, which reached a high with the missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait 
in the run-up to the Taiwan’s first presidential elections in 1996. The PRC 
conducted a series of naval exercises, staging a military attack on Taiwan. 
US muscle flexing in the form of detaching a large navy taskforce to 
Taiwan’s waters, served as added decorum, providing Taiwan’s population 
with a reality check. So it could happen that at the first presidential 
election in 1996, incumbent KMT president Lee Teng-hui won the election 
with 54% of the votes.  
The real watershed moment arrived in 2000, with the next 
presidential election. Chen Sui-bian, the DPP candidate, won the election, 
against polling predictions, in a three-way contest with Lien Chan, the 
incumbent vice-president running on the KMT ticket and James Soong, a 
KMT power house who resigned from the party to run on an independent 
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ticket. Chen won with 39.3% of the votes, only 2.5% ahead of Soong. 
Lien trailed with 23.1%. With a minority of the votes, 55 years of 
continued KMT rule came to an end.  
With the peaceful transition of power, the PRC now had a 
functioning Chinese democracy on its doorstep, a subversion with the 
potential of serving as a role model for an alternative to CCP authoritarian 
rule. Taiwan’s internal politics became relevant to the PRC, favouring its 
historical rival the KMT for which eventual unification, at least formally, is 
not precluded. The PRC’s interference with internal politics is a disstabling 
factor to Taiwan’s democracy.  
 
8 Two major incidents affecting Taiwan at the turn of the 
century 
 
Entering the 21st century, Taiwan was emerging as an nation. Democracy, 
together with freedom of press had brought inclusion and empowerment 
to the people with the outcome of the 2000 presidential elections as 
tangible result. The nation was now geographically limited to Taiwan, 
providing for clear boundaries. The Knowing Taiwan textbooks provided a 
unique Taiwanese history of successive colonisation, setting it apart from 
China. The missile crisis was an affront, strengthening the sense of ‘self’ 
and ‘other’. However, nation building is not all about politics. The political 
developments described coincided with two national disasters with high 
impact. In 1999, Taiwan was struck by a major earthquake with many 
casualties, great destruction and in central Taiwan, the epicentre, actual 
change to the landscape. The death toll exceeded 2,400 and more than 
10,000 people were injured. The economic loss estimated at that time 
was over USD 10 billion (Risk Management Solutions Inc. 2000).  
 
Between March and July 2003, Taiwan was in the grip of the SARS 
epidemic, a highly contagious pneumonia-like disease that ignited a global 
health scare. The disease originated in Mainland China but through travel 
cases of SARS were diagnosed in 32 countries by July 2003. The high 
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mortality rate of those infected was a particular concern. The mortality 
figure is debated. The Taiwan SARS Response team puts this at 27%. Of 
the 668 cases, 181 were fatal. The WHO, using a stricter norm for 
diagnoses, puts the number of confirmed cases at 346 with 73 deaths of 
which 37 directly related to SARS. The WHO mortality rate of 10.7% is 
based on these directly related deaths (Chen et al. 2005). Although the 
fatalities were less than with the 1999 earthquake, the impact was major. 
Social life was greatly affected. More than 150,000 people were 
quarantined during the epidemic. Compared to the number of fatalities, 
SARS exerted a disproportionately large psychological impact (Smith 
citing Liu et al.: 3117). Intrusive government measures reinforced this. 
An example with lasting effect was the requirement to wear face masks 
on the underground system, enforced with a penalty of TWD 3,000. 
Masks are still widely worn today. In this health crisis, international 
politics remained in play. Because of Taiwan’s exclusion from UN 
institutions, Taiwan is not a member of the World Health Organisation 
(WHO). It took the WHO seven weeks to react to Taiwan’s first SARS case 
and this only after permission from China. This delay has reinforced 
Taiwan’s insular character, that of a nation thrown back on itself. 
The two natural disasters had a binding effect on the population. 
The solidarity felt as a country encouraged nation building. On top of the 
empowerment reached through the democratisation process and the 
common threat of the PRC to the way of life on the island, the 
determining a Taiwan identity took centre stage in the public debate.  
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Section 2 
 
9 2004-2013 
 
In the period 2004–2013, I lived and worked in Taiwan. In the previous 
chapters, I built up a history of Taiwan featuring the relationship with 
China and Taiwan’s internal divide, made explicit through the rivalry 
between the KMT and DPP. This chapter is about developments and 
events that were significant or made a particular impression on the people 
living through this period.  
 
Disappointment with DPP presidency 
DPP president Chen Sui-bian came into office in 2000. With the 2001 
elections for the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s parliament, the DPP became 
the largest party. However the KMT, through allying itself with a KMT spin-
off, could still assert power through the ‘Pan Blue Alliance’ providing for a 
rough political environment for the new president. By 2004, much of the 
euphoria of the democratic shift in power had died down. President Chen 
Sui-bian had revoked his call for independence, conforming to the status 
quo, giving up a major election issue. The Chen Sui-bian presidency was 
further weighed down by powerful allegations of favouritism and 
corruption (Bernstein 2008, Copper 2009). Still, Chen Sui-bian was re-
elected in 2004, be it with the smallest of margins, less than 0.5%. On 
the day before the election, Chen Sui-bian and his running mate Annette 
Lu were shot at while campaigning. Injuries were minor but the incident 
gave cause to extensive speculating in the press and social media on 
which interests were behind the shooting. One of the accusations was that 
Chen Sui-bian had staged the assault to win sympathy votes (Tan and Wu 
2005, 522-523). This accusation resurfaced from time to time in the 
following years. In the second term, Chen Sui-bian’s presidency 
deteriorated further. Allegations of large scale corruptions affected his 
family, and finally himself too. When the KMT regained the presidency in 
2008, cashing in on disappointment with DPP rule, Chen Sui-bian and his 
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wife faced charges of corruptions and were sentenced to long prison 
terms. Their harsh treatment in prison has been a point of contention in 
Taiwan and has drawn criticism from human rights groups (Economist 
2012, Healey 2014).   
 
Increasing economic dependency on China  
The buzz word of the time was ‘going China’. China’s economy was 
growing rapidly. This is where the business opportunities where. As in 
many other developed countries, Taiwanese businesses were attracted to 
China’s huge reservoir of cheap labour and land. Not only large companies 
but also SMEs and skilled workers, attracted by higher salaries offered. 
(Hsu 2009, 299, China Post 2015). Estimates of Taiwanese living in China 
vary around one million (Shih 2014). The interaction between the 
population of Taiwan and China is no longer mainly based on family ties of 
Mainlanders arriving in Taiwan with the KMT, but on new contacts made. 
As the development gap between Taiwan and China closes, Taiwan loses 
its economic prosperity as justification of its independent route. Quite the 
contrary. Economic development slowed and, as did local businesses, 
foreign investors increasingly pulled out of Taiwan in favour of investing in 
China. China became Taiwan’s major trade partner (National Development 
Council 2015). An already existing process of economic dependency 
accelerated.  
An important change was the introduction of cross-strait flights. 
Realisation of these flights happened under considerable controversy. 
Even the expression ‘cross-strait flights’ is a political compromise settling 
the issue whether these are domestic or international. Direct transport, 
trade and postal links, the so called ‘three links’, had been halted since 
1949. Most connections went through Hong Kong and Macao which served 
as transportation hubs between Taiwan and China. A flight from Taipei to 
Shanghai for instance, a 1 hour 45-minute direct flight, would take over 
seven hours. The increasingly stronger economic ties between Taiwan and 
China rendered this a situation that needed to be resolved. In 2003, 
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direct charter flights during Chinese New Year were introduced. 
Discussions on expanding this got bogged down on the issue who should 
be negotiating this, government agencies as the Taiwan’s DPP 
government insisted or private parties, stressing the domestic nature of 
the flights, as was the PRC’s stand. Consequently, in 2004 there were no 
charter flights. Later in 2004 the KMT regained control over the 
Legislative Yuan and involved themselves directly in direct flights with the 
PRC government. The PRC took the opportunity to warm up to the 
oppositional KMT, receiving KMT dignitaries and so stirring in the muddy 
waters of Taiwan politics. In 2005, charter flights during Chinese New Year 
resumed and soon expanded to include other festivals. The issue 
remained linked to Taiwan sovereignty and attracted extensive media 
coverage over the years. In 2008, when the KMT reclaimed the 
presidency, cross-strait flights became direct commercial flights almost 
instantly (Jacob 2007). The number of flights expanded rapidly. By 2013, 
this had gone up to 550 a week (CCTV-News 2013).  
With direct regular cross-strait flights, Chines tourists were 
permitted into Taiwan and started arriving, 300,000 in 2008 (Mishkin 
2012). By 2013 this was 2.9 million. In 2015 the number burgeoned to 
4.1 million (Tourism Bureau). With the opening-up of Taiwan to Chinese 
tourists, these tourists became a fixture in Taiwan. The Taiwanese made 
them feel welcome although there were also complaints of crowding out 
of popular sites. The tourist came as guests, not conquerors, and if 
anything, the role of guest and host reinforced the different national 
identities between Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese.  
 
Religious renaissance 
Taiwan is experiencing a religious renaissance, in particular with 
Buddhism. Modern Taiwanese Buddhism is moving away from popular 
religion which incorporates many Buddhist elements with focus on rituals 
aimed at personal fortune, towards religious ethics and social 
responsibilities (Madsen 2008, 295). This movement appeals to the 
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greatly expanded Taiwanese middle class who, freed from material 
predicaments, seek purpose in life. Although based on Chinese religious 
traditions, the worldlier Japanese Buddhism is an important influence as 
is, on an operative level, Protestant Christianity (ibid, 320 -321). A 
building spree of huge modern temple complexes, efficient and relatively 
sober compared to traditional temples, are tangible expressions of this 
modern Buddhism. With the Ciji monastery in Hualian on the East coast, 
Foguangshan near Kaohsiung, Fagushan to the north of Taipei and the 
Chung Tai Chan monastery in Puli, Central Taiwan, the monasteries are 
well spread over the island.  
 
Figure 1: Chung Tai Chan Monastery – 2001 (background) and Museum – 2016  (author’s photo) 
Charities are an important part of the social responsibilities taken 
on by these organisations. They run hospitals, schools and other social 
services and coordinate relief efforts for calamities both at home and 
abroad. These organisations have also branched out abroad, including to 
Europe and the US, so making Taiwan an important religious centre for 
Buddhism. Although these Buddhist organisations can be traced to ethnic 
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origins, they have served to reconcile ethnic groups and so contribute to 
the stability of the country (ibid, 316 – 319).   
 
Projects and exhibitions 
In 2004, two mega projects were in progress: The High Speed Rail (HSR) 
and the construction of the world’s highest skyscraper, the Taipei 101. The 
HSR, when completed, changed the geography of the island. Kaohsiung, 
Taiwan’s southern metropolis, and in many facets Taipei’s rival, came 
under commuting distance. Train travel was slashed from 4.5 – 6 hours to 
1.5 hours while traveling by car takes over 4 hours at the best of times. 
The HSR connects all major cities on the West coast, where the vast 
majority of Taiwan’s population live, and this with a high frequency. A 
train driver described the HSR to me as the fastest metro system in the 
world. This captures the impact the rail system has. Taiwan has become 
smaller, more interconnected. With this the distance between the North 
and the South is bridged in more ways than distance alone, the HSR 
contributes to smoothing out the rough edges of the cultural and ethnic 
division between the regions. 
Looking at reasons for building the Taipei 101 is a study by itself. 
Why decide to build the world’s tallest building in a city with a modest 
skyline? To date the 508-meter-high building sticks out as a phallus 
symbol, unrivalled by other structures. Rivalry will have been a motive for 
building. Having the tallest building in the world fits in with promoting 
Taipei as a model city and with this Taiwan’s modernity, sending a 
message of success, especially to the PRC. A factor will also have been 
that Kaohsiung had the tallest building in Taiwan, the 378-meter high 85 
Sky Tower, completed in 1997. With politics out of the way now, the iconic 
Taipei 101 building, no longer the world’s tallest, dominates the Taipei 
skyline and is a major tourist attraction.  
Taiwan’s political exclusion from the international community limits 
its possibilities to organise high-exposure sports events and exhibitions. 
Reason why events outside of the range of vision of world politics are a 
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welcome opportunity to present Taiwanese hospitality. Two events 
illustrate this: the 2009 Summer Deaflympics and the 2010 Taipei 
International Flora Expo, both in Taipei. These were organised and held 
with a grandeur which would have well served top-tier international 
events. At the Taipei City Hall, a clock counted down to the opening of the 
Deaflympics, starting 365 days before opening (Sports Administration). 
Sports venues were built or thoroughly renovated and the event was 
opened and closed with spectacular ceremonies. The theme of the 
opening ceremony was Taiwan’s natural beauty and culture. The fireworks 
at this ceremony symbolised, as recorded in the Taipei Yearbook 2009, 
that “Taipei will join the world, and the world will join Taipei”. This needs 
no further interpretation (Taipei City Government 2010). The Taipei 
International Flora Expo was on an even bigger scale. This 171-day long 
floral event, held on 92 hectares of inner city park lands, was visited by 
more than 8 million people. These, over 93% Taiwanese, visitors were not 
only drawn to the flower displays and pavilions, but also to the 
international setting of the exposition (China Post 2011). Again, the Taipei 
Yearbook captures the ambition served, mentioning records set by the 
event, and concluding:  
 
“The international standards and the world records established by 
the Taipei Flora Expo are convincing proof to the world that Taiwan 
and Taipei City are most suitable as a country and as a city to host 
international events” (Taipei City Government 2011).  
 
Both events were an outreach for international recognition and about 
breaching imposed isolation. Next is the 2017 Summer Universade. The 
City Hall clock is counting down. 
In hindsight, the political, economic and social developments and 
events described above resulted in quite a different Taiwan in 2013, when 
I left, compared to 2004, when I arrived. Clues to Taiwan’s identities are 
not only found in the past but also, and more importantly, in the way the 
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present is shaped. Heritage is about the present, looking for reassurance 
on who we are or want to be, so providing direction for the way forward. 
This makes influencing the perception of heritage such an important 
political tool. With this in mind I look for Taiwan’s heritage in the following 
chapters. 
 
10 Reconstruction and consolidation of memories 
 
Museums and heritage sites are institutionalised forms of memory 
creation and conservation and will be discussed in the next two chapters. 
First let us look at impromptu symbols, concretising memories. The 
aboriginal population, long time in the margins of Taiwan society with a 
frowned-upon lifestyle, found new appreciation. With Taiwan’s heritage 
now sought in multiculturalism, aboriginal villages have become tourist 
destinations. Driving into an aboriginal village, this is easily recognised by 
the stylistically painted walls of the mountain roads and invitations to 
share their folklore. At the centre of government in Taipei, streets have 
now been renamed after aboriginal tribes in recognition of Taiwan’s 
precolonial roots. The government buildings along these streets are 
homages to the Japanese colonial period, in particular the Presidential 
Office. Renaming streets is a continuum in Taiwan. The street map of 
Taipei reads as the map of China, all major cities are represented, a 
legacy of the martial law period (Kuo 2000, 28). To emphasise the 
Chineseness of Taipei, huge Qing Dynasty style buildings were erected in 
this period. The Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-Sen memorials, the National 
Palace Museum building and the ominous Grand Hotel, conspicuously built 
on a bluff overlooking the city and one of the world’s tallest Chinese style 
buildings, do not fail to provide visitors with the impression that they 
have arrived in China (Harding 2010).  
What the memorials above have in common is that they are 
statements of success. Controversy sets in when a period has been closed 
and history is rewritten. The achievements of the Japanese colonial period 
for example compete with those of the martial law period. Who laid the 
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seed for Taiwan’s economic miracle? Was the basis of Taiwan’s 
development laid in the latter days of the Qing period (Speidel 1976, Teng 
2004, 207-208), or was this a period of revolts and repression in ‘a mere 
outpost’ never fully under control as Vickers describes the gist of the 
2002 National Palace Museum (NPM) exhibition, Into the Wilderness 
(2008, 90). An especially strong symbol of new times is the removal of 
Chiang Kai-shek statues from the public space and put out to graze in a 
field at his mausoleum near Taipei after the DPP took over government in 
2000. 
 
 
Figure 2: Cihu Sculpture Memorial Park (author’s photo) 
Buildings constructed as monuments are of all times. The sentiment 
on the building spree of huge modern Buddhist temples is mixed. 
Although generally sober in style, with the notable exception of the Chung 
Tai Chan temple in Puli, the sheer size of these buildings do not fail to 
impress and there are ongoing discussions on the conflicting message of 
austerity and power they convey.  The 101 building in Taipei and the 
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Kaohsiung 85 are monuments of modernity, so is the sleek High Speed 
Rail with its futuristic stations and, not unimportant, its high functionality. 
Large scale organised events also do not fail to leave their mark. Next to 
the statements made, the 2009 Summer Deaflympics have left Taipei with 
sports facilities to boast with, which is sure to be eclipsed by the 2017 
Summer Universade. The 2010 Taipei International Flora Expo has 
provided Taipei with excellently equipped parks.  
Memorials for accidents and natural disasters lack triumphalism. 
They do not have the assertiveness of symbols of success and are less 
visited. In Nantou County, Central Taiwan for example, in an area still 
vividly showing the marks of the 1999 earthquake, an intact farmhouse 
knocked into a sharp angle serves as monument and brings the 
earthquake to life today. 
  
Some symbols are quite subtle. The face masks still worn widely in 
public to protect others from contagious diseases, which became common 
during the SARS epidemic, are a reminder of the solidarity felt at that 
time. Even more subtle is street-life. With the opening of cross-strait 
flights, Chinese tourists have become a fixture in inner cities and tourist 
sites. Never a major tourist destination, these tourists reaffirm the charm 
of Taiwan. Although there is no lack of complaints on the inconvenience 
caused by the influx of tourists, their appreciation strengthens love of 
country. 
Symbols for heritage can be found everywhere and are powerful 
because they are part of everyday life. Some are constructed with a 
deliberate message, such as buildings, others are casual but they too 
have agency. It is this agency, this intangible value, that makes them 
symbols of heritage.  
 
11 Museums as political institutions 
 
The stories told by symbols in daily life above are not explicit. For 
museums this is quite the opposite. They are exhibits of artefacts isolated 
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from everyday life to support a narrative. There are many types of 
museums but here I focus on historical and human rights museums. The 
historical museums tell the story of those in power and the human rights 
museums that of the oppressed. Saying so, even human rights museums 
have a power aspect. They point to a shift in power, giving the oppressed 
a voice.  
 
Historical museums 
The by far most famous museum in Taiwan is the National Palace Museum 
in Taipei. With 20% of the Qing dynasty treasures, including many of the 
most prized ones, it is the most important Chinese artefacts museum in 
the world (Elliot 2005, 94-97). It is also the most politicised. Brought over 
from Mainland China by the KMT with its retreat to Taiwan in 1949, 
possession of the treasures is branded as theft by the PRC. The Taiwan 
treasures served a dual purpose. It was an important tool in juxtaposing 
Mainland Chinese identity onto Taiwan but also served as legitimation of 
power. A more than 3,000-year old Chinese custom has it that legitimacy 
of succession to power is symbolised by confiscating the treasures of the 
predecessor (Elliot 2005, 5-9). The relevance of this is apparent with the 
stance of DPP hardliners who agreed with the PRC that the treasures 
should be returned as they have no connection to Taiwan. This prompted 
the PRC to take a more pragmatic outlook. The position now is that 
ownership taken by Taiwan of the NPM collection as representing Taiwan’s 
Chinese heritage amplifies the PRC’s claim that Taiwan and China are one 
nation, a point the KMT does not wish to dispute. The DPP, once in power, 
also took a pragmatic position. The point made is now that the arrival of 
the NPM treasures on the island are part of Taiwan’s recent history and 
represent an important contribution to Taiwan’s multicultural mix. (Wang 
2004, 805-806).  
Today the NPM collection also includes Taiwanese artefacts, but the 
most significant attempt to move away from China centricity is the 
initiative to establish a NPM branch museum dedicated to Asian arts and 
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culture in Chiayi in Southern Taiwan. With these evident effort to put 
some distance between Chinese culture and Taiwan’s identity it is 
remarkable that the designation ‘National’ for the NPM has not featured 
more prominently in discussions. Changing or dropping this, as the PRC 
did in 1951 for the Palace Museum in Beijing and so in effect distancing 
itself from the pre-communist values the museum represents, would fit in 
containing Chinese culture to its allotted place in Taiwan’s cultural mix 
(Elliot 2005, 112). 
The Southern Branch of the NPM has been a controversial issue 
from the start of construction in 2004. As an initiative of the DPP 
administration of that time it was, perhaps surprisingly, carried through 
by the KMT administration despite its program of intensifying ties with the 
PRC when they regained government in 2008. A factor for this will have 
been economic reasons. With the cross-strait flights burgeoning, bringing 
in a flood of Chinese tourists, Southern Taiwan was looking to take 
advantage of this. Cancellation of the large scale project would not sit well 
with KMT’s Southern constituents. The project was seriously delayed, but 
the ground-breaking ceremony for the museum building was eventually 
performed by KMT president Ma Ying-jeou in February 2013 (Southern 
Branch).  
The soft opening of the museum was in December 2015 amidst 
considerable controversy, stressing the political sensitivity. In the centre 
of this controversy was the acceptance of replicas of the Zodiac heads 
looted from the Yuanming Yuan, the gardens of the Imperial Summer 
Palace outside Beijing, in 1860 by British troops. The PRC has made it a 
quest to see to it that all the still existing heads return to China as a 
symbol of inflicted injustice by Western colonialists and China’s return to 
power today. The art credentials of the heads are questionable. These 
heads, constructed in 1759 as ornaments for a fountain clock, were 
designed by the Italian Jesuit priest Giuseppe Castiglione who introduced 
Sinified Western styles to the Chinese court. The Zodiac Heads are more 
emblems than art. They are easily recognised by the public and their 
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agency of return to power and dignity is a simple one (Kraus 2010, 201, 
206). The metaphor of the unification of all twelve heads at the new 
museum bringing closure to a painful episode of separation, is not lost on 
Taiwan politics. Adding to the controversy is that these replicas were 
donated by the Hong Kong action movie star Jackie Chen who is a 
member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, a 
political advisory body in the PRC, and is publically dismissive of Taiwan’s 
democracy (China Post 2016). 
I visited the Southern Branch in March 2016. The building and the 
grounds are spectacular and, with explanation to fall back on, the 
architectural symbolism of reaching out to all neighbours is convincing. 
The museum exhibits themselves sent no such message. Instead of telling 
the story of Taiwan’s multicultural origins, with influences from different 
regions and ethnic groups, Taiwan was hardly featured, if at all. The 
exhibits were about Chinese influences on other cultures and, to a lesser 
extent, outside influences on Chinese culture. The replicas of Zodiac 
heads, designed by an Italian and prominently displayed at the entrance 
of the museum building, fitted the display seamlessly. However, change 
was in the air. At the time of my visit DPP, candidate Tsai Ing-wen had 
just won the presidency, but not yet taken up office. The NPM was still 
operating under the tenure of KMT appointed director Fung, Ming-chu. In 
line with the politics involved with the museum, she was replaced in May 
2016 by Lin Jeng-yi, a DPP cabinet level appointment (Hsiao 2016).  
 
Human rights museums 
Human rights memorial museums are a recent development in Taiwan. 
The 2/28 and Kaohsiung incidents and the martial law period as a whole 
are traumatic events that have found their way into Taiwan’s heritage, in 
these cases dark heritage. They do not celebrate human rights 
achievements but rather episodes that many would choose to forget (Wu 
2016, 8). The 2/28 incident is widely commemorated. Next to the Taipei 
228 Memorial Museum, opened in 1997 and located in the 2/28 Peace 
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Memorial Park, there is the National 2/28 Memorial Museum which opened 
in 2011, also in Taipei, and more than 20 other memorials spread over 
Taiwan. Since 1995, 28 February is National Peace Memorial Day, a public 
holiday and official remembrance ceremonies are held on this day (Tsao 
2006, 4-5, Ko 2011) 
The martial law period and the Kaohsiung incident receive much 
less coverage. Two sites are operated by the National Human Rights 
Museum, established in 2011: The Green Island Human Rights Memorial 
and Cultural Park and Jing-Mei Human Rights Memorial and Cultural Park 
in a Taipei suburb. Green Island is the site of a prison holding political 
prisoners and was dedicated as memorial on December 10, 1999, Human 
Rights Day, a reference to the Kaohsiung incident on the same day in 
1979. Jing-Mei was the site of the military court where the major trials 
against dissidents were held. This is the site where those involved with 
the Kaohsiung incident were tried.  
The establishment of human rights museums by itself does not 
imply that painful history has been dealt with. The International 
Committee of Memorial Museums in Remembrance of Victims of Public 
Crimes (ICMEMO), a committee of the International Council of Museums 
(ICOM), has published a list of aims which go beyond remembrance. The 
core breaks down to questions as: How could it happen? What are lessons 
learnt? What is the relation of these past events with modern social, 
political and democratic developments? (Tsao 2006: 3). In Taiwan, the 
objectivity required for this is clouded by political distrust. Through 
superficial routines of honouring victims, the KMT’s martial law history is 
contained. The KMT’s continuous existence is a show of resilience, while 
the DPP is inclined to recede into the victim role and claim history on its 
side (Wu 2016). No truth and reconciliation commission has been set up, 
as have been in other countries, working towards the aims of ICMEMO 
(Tsao 2006, 6). Through oversimplification, different versions of the truth 
circulate, compromising the basis for opinions held. An example of 
missing the point of a human rights site is the haggling over the name of 
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the Jing-Mei Human Rights Memorial and Cultural Park. When designated 
a human rights site in 2007, it was named the ‘Taiwan Human Rights 
Jingmei Park’. When the KMT took over government in 2008, the park was 
renamed ‘Jingmei Cultural Park’ due to party sensitivities. Human rights 
was dropped. Opposition against this resulted in changing the name of 
the site again to its current name, but the result of this bartering is that 
reference to Taiwan was dropped, so localizing the site (National Human 
Rights Museum 2015).    
The political message of museums is as volatile as politics itself. The 
artefacts displayed may be isolated from daily life, their agency is not. As 
with the symbols of heritage discussed in the previous paragraph, it is the 
intangible value of artefacts, the relationship of people with objects, that 
is relevant. Museums influence this. The museums discussed above are no 
exception. With absence of closure, the human rights museums will not 
bring population groups together. With questions of who, why, what 
happened to the victims and where are their remains not answered, the 
‘mainlander’ as a group will remain stigmatized, with ‘mainlander’ not 
restricted to Taiwan. This is a factor in both the relationship with the PRC 
and the internal divide.  
 
12 Story told by potential world heritage sites 
 
A nation’s institutes can be categorised as civic-territorial or ethno-
cultural. Civic-territorial institutes are, amongst others, a constitution, 
armed forces and the administrative bureaucracy. Global citizenship is 
also a national institute (Wang 2004, 789, 805). Reason why Taiwan is 
keen on membership of international institutions and China denies Taiwan 
this. Ethno-culture denotes elements that define a country. For ethno-
cultural institutes, Taiwan defines the following categories: antiquities, 
historical sites, national arts, folkways, and national-cultural landscapes 
(Ministry of Culture). This is the terrain of Taiwan’s potential World 
Heritage sites.  
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The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO) mandate includes conservation of sites of outstanding cultural 
or natural importance to the common heritage of humanity. These are the 
World Heritage sites. Recognition of heritage sites is highly political. 
Although UNESCO’s stated role is to be a defender of ‘cultures’ against 
globalisation and it allies itself with NGO’s and local communities, 
nomination remains the prerogative of UN member states and admitted 
Associated Members (Askew 2010, 39). Invitation for association needs to 
come from the UNESCO General Counsel, comprised of the member 
states. Without PRC consent this will not be forthcoming any time soon 
for Taiwan.  
In 2002, Taiwan’s Counsel for Cultural affairs set the selection of 
Taiwan’s first 11 potential World Heritage sites in motion. By 2016 this 
was 17. Five sites are natural parks or reserves. One site, the Lo-sheng 
leprosy sanatorium, is a human rights site. When analysing the remaining 
potential sites set against historical periods, we see cultural diversity 
emerging as a theme.  
 
Table: Potential world heritage sites shown per period 
Austronesian Beinan Archaeological Site & Mt. Dulan 2500 – 300 BC 
Western 
Fort San Domingo & Surrounding Historical 
Buildings, Tamsui 
1644 
Japanese 
Shuei-Jin Jiou Mining Sites 1895 – 1987 
Old Mountain Line Railway 1908 
Alishan Forest Railway 1912 
Wushantou Reservoir & Chainan Irrigation 
Waterway 
1920 - 1930 
Marshal Law 
Kimen Battlefield Culture 1949 - 1992 
Matsu Battlefield Culture 1949 - 1992 
Aboriginal 
Orchid Island and Tao (Yami) - 
Paiwan & Rukei Settlements of Slate Constructions 1500 - present 
Hakka Taoyuan Tableland and Ponds 1920 
Penghu Island 
Fishing Community 
Penghu Stone Fish Weirs – Twin Hearts Stone Weir 1937 
 
Taiwan’s prehistoric people are linked to Austronesia through the Beinan 
Archaeological site. The Dutch colonial period is represented by Fort San 
Domingo in Tamsui, near Taipei. The Japanese colonial period is 
acknowledged by four infrastructural and industrial sites and the KMT 
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martial law period by the battlefields of the outlying Kimen and Matsu 
islands. Orchard Island and the Paiwan & Rukei Settlements are dedicated 
to Taiwan’s aboriginal tribes. Hakka culture is represented by the Taoyuan 
Tableland and Ponds and for the Penghu islands fishing community this is 
done by the Penghu Stone Fish Weirs (Ministry of Culture).  
Conspicuously not represented is the Qing dynasty period (1683 – 
1895). There is no potential heritage site celebrating achievements of the 
Qing administration, a statement by itself. This while in the martial law 
period only Qing dynasty heritage was recognised as Taiwan’s heritage.    
 
13 Contemporary symbols and expressions of identity 
 
The term ‘Cultural Turn’ depicts the recognition of a movement towards a 
multidiscipline approach to history, particularly the inclusion of cultural 
anthropology. Looking for Taiwan’s identity, focus is turned to 
characteristics contributing to identity such as variances in social 
structures, language, politics, religion, film and technology. History, 
originating in social sciences, interested in studying, interpreting and 
understanding events and developments, has moved closer towards 
humanities, which is interested in the unique character of human 
interaction. Culture is not static, it changes over time, and with this 
identity changes. A common heritage, the domain of conventional history, 
does not imply a common culture and even less so a common future 
(Corcuff 2005, 154).  
Taiwan’s identity is not fossilised; it is a living 
organism. Looking for contemporary symbols and 
expression of identity, a wide field presents itself. 
Arguably the most powerful symbol is the map of the 
main island of Taiwan used as logo. The logo is instantly 
recognizable. It is a fixture in virtually all visible media 
in Taiwan. Used for promotional 
materials, merchandizing, branding, and much more, it 
stands for Taiwan and all things Taiwanese. It shows 
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Taiwan in isolation, with borders recognizable from space resembling the 
peaceful form of a leaf. It is a message of self-determination, widely 
broadcasted (Anderson 2006, 175).     
Films provide an insight on popular level to trending subjects and 
Taiwan has a vibrant film industry. In the period under review, 2004-
2013, more than 400 films were produced, including over 300 feature 
films and over 60 documentaries (Taiwan Film Institute). As in the film 
industry in general, the majority of the films are social realism movies 
featuring crime, sex and violence, romantic comedies and high school 
movies; films with short shelf life. Still, over 20% of the films are 
screened at film festivals, many receiving awards or honours. Analysing 
the synopsis of the films, we see that for almost all films the scene is 
Taiwan, with a disproportional number playing in Taipei. The films are 
primarily for a local audience and tap into the Taiwanese way of life. 
Taipei represents modernity. It is the model of a 21st century mega city, 
on par with cities as Hong Kong, Shanghai and Tokyo, showcasing 
Taiwan’s modern urban lifestyle.  
Looking for themes in Taiwan’s film oeuvre, Aboriginals, baseball 
and LGBT stand out. Films and documentaries on Aboriginals and baseball 
are released almost annually. The Aboriginals represent the exotic Taiwan, 
a lifestyle that is more myth than reality. These films are a detox for the 
raw urban life films.  
Baseball is an element that distinguishes Taiwan from China, where 
it is not a national sport. The sport is very much part of Taiwan’s identity. 
Introduced by the Japanese, the KMT government, when taking over 
control of the island, tried to eradicate baseball, seeing it as a remnant of 
colonial occupation. However, the game was rooted in Taiwanese society 
and the government soon gave up. International baseball successes are 
national achievements. A daily exhibition of this are the 500-Taiwandollar 
bills which carry the image of Taiwanese Little League baseball players 
celebrating victory (Harmsen 2009).  
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Recurrence of the LGBT theme in feature films testify to Taiwan’s 
liberal society. Taiwan has come a long way since democratising in the 
1980s. It is now one of the most progressive places in Asia in terms of 
LGBT rights. Taiwan’s yearly gay pride parade is the largest in Asia. A bill 
raised in 2012 to legalise same sex marriage failed to pass, but with the 
DPP now in government, being more sensitive to the issue, such a bill is 
expected to pass the next time round (Nylander 2016). 
Historical films are rare, which relativises the importance of history 
in daily Taiwanese life. The most notable example in the period analysed 
of actually recreating a memory using film is ‘The Straight Story’ (2005) 
directed by Yu-shan Huang. The film tells the story of the Takachiho Maru, 
a Japanese passenger liner torpedoed by an American submarine off the 
coast of Taiwan in 1943, claiming more than 1000 lives. Many were from 
Taiwan. The Japanese governor in Taiwan at that time forbade any 
reference to this tragedy, another example of denied history. Two films on 
resistance to Japanese colonialism were also released. ‘Blue Brave’ (2008) 
directed by Chih-yu Hung on Hakka resistance in 1895, when Japan took 
over Taiwan, and ‘Warriors of the Rainbow: Seediq Bale’ (2011) on an 
Aboriginal uprising in 1930, tapping in on the revisionist version of the 
Japanese colonial period. The most frequent historical theme is that of 
fleeing to Taiwan due to the events in 1949, the relapse into poverty this 
brought on, grief of separation and exposure to authoritarian repression. 
These films bring nuance to the narrative of Mainland Chinese colonisation 
of Taiwan after the war.  
The local themes of the films show a living heritage. They show a 
way of life rather than explaining this, providing insight into heritage 
rather than being an instrument to impress an authorized heritage on the 
audience as museums often do. Anthropology brings this perspective to 
history, deflating claims based on history and formalized cultural heritage.    
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Section 3 
 
14 View of foreign representatives to Taiwan 
 
After all is said and done, how does knowledge of Taiwan’s history and 
cultural heritage affect the insight of those for whom such insight is an 
important professional attribute? For this link to practical application of 
the topic of this thesis, I had the opportunity to interview three country 
representatives and mirror my understanding with theirs and so 
complement my study. There are no embassies in Taiwan, save the very 
few countries left that still recognise Taiwan as representing China. 
Embassy services are provided by trade offices. Representatives of these 
trade offices function as de-facto ambassadors. Through individual 
interviews, the three former representatives, in function in the period 
2004 – 2013 when I lived and worked in Taiwan, shared their thoughts  
with me. They do this explicitly on a private title basis. The 
representatives are Henrik Byström, Swedish Trade Council – Taipei 
September 2001 to December 2009, Menno Goedhart and Hans Fortuin – 
Director Netherlands Trade & Investments Office Taiwan – August 2002 to 
August 2010, and August 2010 to July 2015 respectively. Below is a 
compilation of their opinions. Factual information is verified and reference 
shown. Two interviews were performed and recorded using Skype, the 
third interview was face to face and recorded through written transcript. 
The interviews were free format interviews addressing Taiwan’s identity, 
the China – Taiwan relationship, international politics affecting Taiwan, 
internal politics and economy. From the responses, detached from 
nationalist sentiments, a country in transition emerges, determined by its 
recent history but threatened by its old.   
     
Identity 
Taiwan is open to other cultures. Western, Japanese, and other cultures 
blend into the Chinese culture. Ethnic restaurants, popular in Taiwan, are 
a common way of sharing culture in ordinary life. Consumerism in general 
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is a form of cultural interchange as is tourism and study abroad. A 
younger generation is leading this cultural openness. When looking for 
agents of change in Taiwan, do not look at traditional segregation 
between elite, middle and lower class. The change is generational 
determined. An important development is that of the mentality of the new 
generation. While Taiwanese students studying abroad had the reputation 
of being diligent students, they were not known for participating in 
student activities. The new generation students is different. They do 
participate, are actively involved in academic discussions and take the 
opportunity, whilst abroad, to travel extensively. They have a new 
assertiveness.  
The 2014 Sunflower movement, in which students resisted further 
economic integrations with China, is a symptom of the new assertiveness. 
Students protested against ratifying the Cross Strait Service Trade 
Agreement (CSSTA) with China, which would open up Taiwan’s services 
market to China’s industries. In their view, the agreement was the result 
of an undemocratic process and would lead to economic annexation of 
Taiwan, jeopardizing Taiwan’s political and economic autonomy and with 
this their freedom. These concerns were dealt with poorly by the ruling 
KMT, who insufficiently realised the shift in sentiments due to the shift in 
demographics. The Sunflower movement was a factor in the loss of the 
2016 presidential elections. 
As for Taiwan’s Chinese cultural heritage, similar culture does not 
imply shared identity. An example the DPP likes to use to underline this 
statement of similar cultures but separate countries is Germany and 
Austria. For outsiders they may look similar, but the inhabitants recognise 
different identities. While China takes the ethnic approach of a nation 
based on a common, dominant, culture, the Taiwanese recognise a 
difference between cultural kinship and that what determines a society. 
This is Western influence in Taiwanese thinking. E.g. Anglo-Saxon 
countries share a common heritage and language and yet are 
independent and recognise and celebrate a unique identity. The same 
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applies to Spanish-speaking Latin America. A distinct, and encouraging, 
characteristic of the relationship between the Taiwanese and the Chinese, 
as neighbours, is the absence of the animosity often found between 
people of neighbouring countries. Opening up Taiwan to China through 
trade and travel has brought appreciation for the ‘other’, but at the same 
time this recognition as ‘other’ strengthens Taiwan’s identity. The political 
establishment has insufficiently realised the impact of this. This also 
applies to Taiwan’s influence on China. The success of Taiwanese 
performing artists in China for instance, may also be attributed to the 
aura of freedom these artists have for the Mainlanders. Taiwan, and to 
this respect also Hong Kong, are windows to China’s future. They are 
China’s Trojan horse. 
 
China – Taiwan relationship 
The KMT comes out of a situation of unaccepted loss of the civil war. This 
denial has formed the situation Taiwan is in today. Denial goes both ways. 
Taiwan links its history to the establishment of the ROC in 1911 while 
nothing happened that year in Taiwan. It was a Japanese colony. In 2005 
China held a big celebration to commemorate the 60th year of liberation of 
Taiwan (Xinhua 2005). In China, thinking of Taiwan as a separate country 
is a non-issue. To the PRC government it is completely obvious that it is a 
part of China, there is no discussion on this. Culture, language and history 
cement this. Taiwan is a ‘pirate province’. A wrong that needs to be set 
right. Only at that time there will be full closure to the civil war. In Taiwan 
on the other hand, similar culture and language is acknowledged, but also 
that Chineseness in Taiwan and China have taken different routes. During 
the cultural revolutions developments even went opposite ways. While 
Mao Zedong was combatting China’s four olds, culture, customs, habits 
and ideas standing in the way of modernity, the KMT was installing these 
as Chinese virtues in Taiwan. Taiwan’s democracy has set Taiwan and 
China further apart.  
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Politically, the relationship between the CCP and the KMT has 
changed dramatically. In the period of China’s transition towards a market 
economy in the 1980s and 1990s, KMT’s successful development of 
Taiwan’s economy served as example for the CCP. China has become 
more like Taiwan was during the latter years of the martial law period. 
From adversary in the civil war, the KMT now has a preferred status for 
the CCP when dealing with Taiwan. China offers Taiwan autonomy in 
China’s 2005 anti-secession law (art 5). Problem here of course is lack of 
recourse. There is no way back to reclaim autonomy if agreements are 
not met (BBC News). 
A successful and democratic Taiwan is a threat to the legitimacy of 
the CCP. The need for autocratic leadership to manage success becomes 
less obvious. This increases domestic tension and weakens CCP support. 
On level of the population, it is increasingly difficult for the Chinese 
leadership to maintain the image of Taiwan as the enemy. 
Notwithstanding the elaborate censorship, it becomes hard to portray 
Taiwan as being in need of liberation. The warming up of relations 
between the Taiwan and China when the KMT retook the presidency in 
2008 did little to lift the military threat and Taiwan’s international 
isolation. To the contrary. China’s military build-up against Taiwan 
continued. A barrage of rockets is aimed at Taiwan. International 
manoeuvring room became even less. China did not yield a single 
concession. With the liberalisation of the Chinese economy, the cost of a 
military conflict with Taiwan will be enormous. China therefore may have 
lost momentum for use of force to resolve the conflict. The long term 
future remains uncertain but looking at the next 10 years, the status quo 
will hold.  
 
International Politics 
The main adversaries in North-East Asia are the United States and China. 
This slates US neo-imperialism, based on power and influence, against 
China’s territorial claims. The US claims the moral high ground through 
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advocating democracy, human rights, free trade and personal freedom. 
The UN, heavily influenced by Western standards at time of 
establishment, echoes these values. China’s claim is based on prevailing 
Han Chinese culture and an assertiveness as rebound to inflicted injustice 
in the past. This Han domination leads to an ethnic-based nationalism 
which is an element of the continuous claim on Taiwan. Political influence 
on countries outside of China culture is not a priority.  
Next to the issue of Taiwan, there is the issue on sovereignty of the 
South and East China Seas. Taiwan is geographically strategically 
positioned, forming the division between the two seas. Still, a coupling of 
the two territorial claims should not be supposed. The claim on the seas 
should be seen in the perspective of 19th-20th century humiliation of China 
by Western and Japanese imperialism. China, in a reversal of the power 
balance, is reclaiming its political clout. The situation in the South and 
East China seas is potentially more dangerous than the situation with 
Taiwan. It is more combustible. The tension must be seen in relationship 
to the Obama administration’s announcement to concentrate foreign 
policy and military policing of the Pacific region. This brings the US in 
confrontation with China. Taiwan is keeping a low profile in this conflict 
although it also stakes claims to South China Sea islands. The KMT does 
not actively oppose China on their claims, while the DPP with its pro-
independence agenda, has even less affinity with territorial claims 
originating from the One-China policy.    
Taiwan has had the opportunity to be much better positioned than it 
is, but poor choices were made. Insisting in 1949 that the KMT 
government remained the sole representative of China blocked the 
possibility to formally divide the country, such as Germany, Vietnam, 
Korea. Also, in 1971, with the replacement of the Taiwan by the PRC in 
the UN, the US apparently offered to lobby for Taiwan to stay in the UN if 
they gave up their seat in the security council for the PRC, but Taiwan 
refused upfront. The US did put this up for vote but the motion was 
defeated (United Nations 1974). In the 1980s and 1990s, at the time of 
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Taiwan’s rapid economic development, the government resisted opening 
up the country to free trade and liberating its internal market. Had they 
done this, this would have drawn substantial foreign investments and 
foreign professionals to the island. This internationalisation would have 
served as a deterrent against isolation. 
A concern for Taiwan is the movement in the US to retreat into 
itself, changing geopolitical dynamics, obvious in the 2016 presidential 
campaign. The right wing of the Republican party and the left wing of the 
Democratic party question the cost of American defence responsibilities 
taken on abroad not obviously benefitting the American people. This 
affects the security provided by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, 
accepted when the US switched recognition of the government of China 
from the ROC to the PRC. A particularly worrying scenario is agreeing with 
China for China to neutralise North Korea in exchange for dropping the 
defence agreement with Taiwan. Reviewing the situation, we may expect 
China’s position in respect to Taiwan continuing to strengthen, both 
economical and politically. On the other hand, the tension in the region 
caused by China’s claim to the South and East China sea provides an 
opportunity for Taiwan to tighten ties with surrounding countries.    
 
The KMT versus the DPP 
In broad strokes, the KMT is led by business interests while for the DPP 
local politics takes priority. In foreign policy, the KMT has always been 
preoccupied with China and US relations. The KMT government showed 
little interest in contact with European representatives to Taiwan. This in 
contrast to the DPP, with its focus on acceptance in the world community 
at large. Ethnicity remains an important factor in Taiwan politics. Looking 
at the statistics, only 14% of the Taiwanese are direct decedents of 
Mainland Chinese, arriving in Taiwan in the wake of the KMT. As a result of 
the Sinification program of the martial law period, there are more that 
identify themselves with China, but still they remain a minority. It does 
explain why the DPP, with its base in the Hoklo majority, cannot count on 
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a majority based on ethnicity alone (Central Intelligence Agency, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs). This ethnic factor in politics has led to cultivation of 
Taiwan being a multicultural society. Especially the Aboriginal and Hakka 
communities have gained prominence and are acknowledged as 
contributing to a unique Taiwanese culture.  
With the acceptance of a multicultural society, politics based on 
ethnicity became less relevant. The KMT was already an inclusive party 
and the DPP too has moved in this direction. Appealing to a younger 
generation, grown up in a democratic Taiwan, is now key for support. The 
DPP is more successful in this. With the 2016 election loss, a definite end 
may have come to KMT’s majority rule. A singular focus on China no 
longer suffices as political guideline. The DPP however consists of 
fractions with very different outlook. As does the KMT, the DPP has an ‘old 
hands’ fraction that is driven by rancour, not necessary leading to the 
right political decisions, while there is a younger generation in the DPP, 
with increasing influence, not affected by this. If not addressed, the DPP 
is at risk of splitting up. The future therefore may well be ruling through 
coalitions which may be a good thing for Taiwan. With negotiations the 
rough edges of Taiwan politics will smoothen. 
   
Economics 
Growth of Taiwan’s economy has slowed down considerably since the 
boom of the 1980s and 1990s, but Taiwan is still economically relevant in 
the global market. In 2015 it had the 5th largest foreign exchange reserve 
and was 22nd on the list of largest economies (Central Intelligence 
Agency, Knoema). Looking at Taiwan’s industry, growth is mainly 
concentrated in a small number of industries, most notably 
semiconductors and electronics. Taiwan’s innovative strength is 
concentrated in these industries. The smaller, often family-owned 
businesses in other sectors have lost their competitive edge.  
Looking at business interests in the context of the unification 
question, the image is diffuse. Large companies eyeing the Chinese 
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market may profit from unification, but equally, Taiwanese companies, 
both large and small, dependent on the Taiwanese market, will suffer 
from unhindered competition from often much larger mainland 
companies. The KMT, acting on the importance of Taiwan’s growth 
industries to its economic development, committed itself to opening up 
the Taiwanese market to Mainland China industries, and entered into 
reciprocal trade arrangements with China to accommodate this. This 
sparked grass roots concern which in 2014, with the KMT pushing for 
acceptance of the cross-strait Services Agreement, was given shape by 
the Sunflower movement.  
The KMT did little to deflate reliance on China through trade 
arrangements with other countries, although they did enter into trade 
agreements with New Zealand and Singapore in 2013, this being the first 
time with countries Taiwan holds no official diplomatic relations with 
(Central Intelligence Agency). Taiwan could improve accessibility to its 
own market unilaterally, befitting its neoliberal approach to business 
internally. However, professed trade liberation is countered with excessive 
regulatory requirements. The auto and food industries are examples 
(European Chamber 2015). Also public outcry for largely constructed 
issues is an instrument. An extended issue on perceived health hazards 
with US and Canadian beef products illustrates this (Kastner 2015).   
Because of persistent protectionism, Taipei’s ambition to be a global 
economic and financial centre will not happen. It will remain a national 
hub. This is not to say there were no chances. If Taiwan, in its heydays, 
had opened itself up to foreign businesses and truly liberalised its 
economy, this may have attracted a surge of foreign talent into Taiwan, 
especially in the IT-sector. This would have been the catalyst for further 
internationalisation. As it is, it is now Taiwanese talent that is moving to 
hubs abroad, invoking a brain drain restraining developments. 
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Reflection 
A primary function of European representative offices is to facilitate 
business contacts between Europe and Taiwan. Additionally, their clients, 
European businesses and Taiwanese businesses with interests in Europe, 
represent themselves towards the Taiwanese government in the European 
Chamber of Commerce and Trade (ECCT). This provides a platform to 
solicit policy advice towards the improvement of Taiwan’s investment 
climate without the political restrictions the European representatives 
face. The ECCT does this through issuance of ‘position papers’.  
The 2016 position paper addresses issues also mentioned by the 
trades representatives interviewed, such as enabling the benefits of 
globalisation through trade agreements, cutting down on excessive 
regulatory requirements hindering imports, and opening up the job 
market to foreign workers. What stands out in the advice given is the 
explicit mentioning that this often goes against public opinion, which is 
reluctant to accept immediate and short term cost of globalisation and the 
loss of national control that needs to be accepted, but to go against this 
and manage resistance (European Chamber of Commerce 2015).  
Considering the surge of populism in world politics, with the UK Brexit and 
the US presidential election victory of Donald Trump in 2016 standing out 
as examples, this is poor advice. The populist DPP’s return to power in 
Taiwan in 2016 underscores this. Democracy, Taiwan’s prize, will always 
function in a field of tension, this should be accepted, not restrained.  
 
15 Summary and conclusion 
 
History is the surest way to success. Nations, a product of modernity, 
choose their history to support their image and ambitions and take their 
place in the world system of nations in which they are recognised as 
entity and accepted as counterpart. Occasionally this is denied, as is the 
case with Taiwan. This implies isolation and generally marginalisation. 
Here Taiwan is an exception. With a strong economy, extensive trade 
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relationships and well established government institutions, Taiwan proves 
that sovereignty does not require formal recognition.  
Changing history is central to both claim and denial of Taiwan’s 
nationhood. With its retreat to Taiwan after losing the mainland to the 
CCP, the KMT used Taiwan, under martial law, as a blank sheet on which a 
China by proxy was projected, eradicating Taiwan’s own history and 
heritage in the process. In 1987, when martial law, a public debate 
started on a unique Taiwanese history of successive colonisation, 
opposing a common Chinese history and cultural heritage.  
With democracy, heavily divided Taiwan became apparent. The KMT, 
with its history of suppression, remained dominant. Deflection of 
responsibility for the martial law period to Chang Kai-shek, the effects of 
Sinification, Taiwan’s economic success and credit for initiating 
democratisation are reasons for the party’s resilience. The KMT keeps 
reunification with China open.     
The pro-independent DPP, with its roots in the protest movement, 
emerged as populist party, with an ethnic base in the Hoklo majority. The 
KMT’s administrative experience, influence in the bureaucracy and 
extensive financial means, put the DPP in a disadvantage. Also the KMT’s 
status quo policy regarding China attracted the more cautious voters.  
Nation building is not all about politics. Illustrative are two major 
incidents directly before 2004 – 2013, the period under review. The 1999 
earthquake with its high number of casualties and collateral damage, and 
the SARS epidemic that disrupted social life in 2003 both had its impact 
on Taiwan coming together as a country  
In hindsight, 2004 – 2013 was a period of important changes. The 
first DPP presidency, that of Chen Sui-bian, was a disappointment, 
succumbing to charges of corruption by the presidential family. Economic 
dependency on China increased. China was seen as the land of 
opportunities attracting Taiwanese businesses and skilled workers. 
Economic ties with Taiwan became even closer in 2008, when the KMT 
regained presidency and cross-strait flights, ceased in 1949, resumed, 
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allowing Chinese tourism to Taiwan. Next to these political and economic 
developments, a Buddhist renaissance resonating abroad, the 
sophistication of the high speed rail, the attention for the world’s tallest 
building and the prestige derived from hosting international events, all 
point to a society defying isolation, demanding recognition as a modern 
country. 
In the early chapters, Taiwan’s past and present passed in review 
with different versions of history and cultural heritage attached. These are 
captured in memories; constructed, passed-on or original. This through 
impromptu symbols in daily life or institutionalised in museums and 
heritage sites.  
Buildings, street names, parks, ruins, habits and more passed as 
symbols and all are memorials, reminding of Taiwan’s history and 
heritage, allowing a personal interpretation. In contrast, museums and 
heritage sites have predetermined narratives. The NPM and its Southern 
branch in Chayi are examples of highly politicised historical museums, 
with narratives changing with the party in power. They are at the centre 
of the debate Taiwan’s Chineseness, both in the stand-off with the PRC 
and internally. The discussed human rights museums, commemorating 
the 2/28 incident and the atrocities of the White Terror period have not 
shed partisan interest. They have not gone past remembrance, falling 
short of answering, in depth, how it could happen, lessons learnt and 
relationship of events leading up to the incidents with current 
developments.            
As for Taiwan’s potential world heritage sites; in the current political 
environment, there is no chance that any these will be nominated by 
UNESCO. The selection, determined at a time of DPP rule, therefore is 
primarily a political statement. The cultural heritage sites selected are 
done so to emphasise Taiwan’s multi-cultural heritage. Conspicuously 
absent are sites from the Qing dynasty period; a clear denouncement of 
that period.  
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Taiwan’s film industry in particular provides an insight on a popular 
level to trending subjects. Aboriginals and baseball are popular themes, in 
line with the attention they receive in other media. Recurrence of the 
LGBT theme mirrors Taiwan’s liberal approach to this, which includes a 
road towards gay marriage, which would be a first in Asia. What all these 
themes have in common is their Taiwaneseness. There were very few 
historical films in the period analysed, indicating that the living heritage of 
film may be a more reliable source of identity than the history of the 
politicians.        
It is the interviews with foreign representatives to Taiwan that link 
theory with practice. Taiwan’s identity, the China – Taiwan relationship, 
international politics, the differences KMT and the DPP have and Taiwan’s 
economic development all have tangible impact on Taiwan’s functioning in 
the world system of nations, regardless whether formally recognised or 
not. Developments in Taiwan cannot be seen in isolation or merely in 
context with the relationship with the PRC. The differences between the 
KMT and the DPP can also be traced to tension between globalism and 
populism that is playing out around the world.   
In this thesis I set out to research the effects of the absence of a 
nation-building tradition in Taiwan as a country, set off against China’s 
strong nation-building tradition. Social space for a search for Taiwanese 
identity only opened up after 1987 when, with democracy, unrestricted 
public debate became possible. 1987 was not a revolution. The KMT 
stayed in power and proved to have a democratic base while the young 
DPP, with its base in activism for democracy and drive for independence, 
did not appeal to a majority.  
The question on Chineseness or Taiwaneseness proved to be as 
much an internal debate as an external one. The political debate gave 
authority to history and cultural heritage as determiners for Taiwan’s 
identity, concentrating on arguments for a common Chinese heritage or 
for a multi-cultural heritage. The latter has gained considerable ground 
since, and found its way into national institutions. The Knowing Taiwan 
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textbooks now teaches children a Taiwanese history outside of Chinese 
history and many museums and heritage sites express the new narrative. 
The divide on this issue no longer coincides with the differences between 
the KMT and the DPP but has moved to that between KMT hardliners and 
pragmatics. 
Is history and cultural heritage the right approach? Will changes to 
the past make people distinctly Taiwanese? I do not believe so. With this 
line of reasoning identity can be dismissed by simply rejecting a nation’s 
history. A common starting point does not imply a common path and a 
slight change in direction can put a lot of space between people. It is the 
changes people live through together and cope with that shapes, in this 
case, Taiwaneseness. Dealing with isolation and living under threat are 
determinants. Ultimately it is not history or a formalised cultural heritage, 
such as the PRCs Chinese heritage or the Knowing Taiwan textbooks that 
determine Taiwan’s identity, but the heritage the Taiwanese, individually, 
wish to be associated with and the diversity choice allows. 
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